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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a mixed track record in challenging tax shelters in civil
enforcement actions, the federal government has started prosecuting
tax shelter cases criminally. One of the top accounting firms, KPMG,
and several of its partners and managers have come under scrutiny for
developing and promoting certain tax shelters known colloquially as
BLIPS, FLIP, OPIS, and SOS.' Under threat of criminal indictment,
KPMG decided to save itself. KPMG admitted criminal culpability,
paid a fine, and agreed to implement a compliance and ethics program
and submit to several years of government monitoring in exchange for
deferred prosecution. Meanwhile, the government's criminal
prosecution of several former KPMG tax professionals continues to
work its way through the federal district courts.4 Yet some believe
that the tax shelters promoted by KPMG were not clearly abusive, or
at least not criminally so.' One federal district court has decided that
a key statutory element of the BLIPS structure was consistent with
then-existing interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).6
1 See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Criminal Tax Enforcement of Legal-Source Income
Cases Is Up, 113 TAx NOTES 392 (Oct. 30, 2006) (noting DOJ Tax Division's current
emphasis on tax shelter prosecutions); Armando Gomez & Brian Duncan, Detection
& Dissection: How the IRS Identifies and Combats Tax Shelters and Regulates Those
Who Advise On Aggressive Transactions, 736 PLI/TAx 951, 1009-10 (2006) (noting a
shift in criminal prosecutions from nonfilers, drug dealers, and tax protesters to more
mainstream tax matters).
2 BLIPS, FLIP, OPIS, and SOS are acronyms for Bond Linked Issue Premium
Structures, Foreign Leveraged Investment Program, Offshore Portfolio Investment
Strategy, and Short Option Strategy, respectively. See discussion infra notes 94-127
and accompanying text (discussing the BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS transactions).
3 See KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement Dated August 26, 2005, reprinted
in 1571 PLI/CoRP. 659 (2006).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding
that defendant's conversations with firm counsel were not privileged); United States
v. Stein, 461 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (adjourning trial sine die due to late
production of discovery and pending resolution of legal fee issues); United States v.
Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that government violated
defendants' right to counsel); Superseding Indictment, United States v. Stein, N. S1 05
Crim. 0888(LAK), 2005 WL 4168176 (Oct. 17, 2005).
5 See, e.g., Robert Weisberg & David Mills, A Very Strange Indictment, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 12, 2005 at A16 (criticizing the government's case against KPMG).
6 See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608,
615-19, 625-26 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (ruling for the taxpayer on the BLIPS structure's
interpretation of the term "liabilities" under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section
752). The Klamath opinion arose in a civil action, not a criminal prosecution, and did
not conclusively resolve the case in favor of the taxpayer. See discussion infra notes
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Many who are more skeptical of the KPMG shelters nevertheless are
concerned about distinguishing the actions of the defendant tax
professionals from those of ordinary tax planners under the specter of
criminal enforcement.
Tax shelters have a bad reputation, for good and obvious reasons.
Among other things, abusive tax shelters illegitimately deprive the
government of much-needed revenue and generally breed disrespect
for the tax system. Note that in that last sentence I added the word
"abusive." Not all tax shelters fall into that category, at least in the
eyes of the law.8 While most tax experts agree that abusive tax
107-10 (discussing the Klamath opinion further). The Klamath court has since
decided the case in favor of the government on economic substance grounds, though
the court also found various civil penalties assessed by the government to be
inapplicable. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, __ F. Supp. 2d
__ 2007 WL 283790 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
' See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, KPMG: Has the Prosecution Overcharged the
Crime?, 112 TAx NOTES 405 (July 31, 2006) (noting concerns of many practitioners,
analyzing the government's case in United States v. Stein, and suggesting that the
government may have overreached); Editorial, KPMG In Wonderland, WALL ST. J.
Oct. 6, 2005, at A14 (describing prosecutions as "troubling"); John Klotsche, Text of
Klotsche Remarks at Tax Controversy Seminar, 2006 TNT 30-31 (Feb. 14, 2006)
(attempting to justify tax shelter prosecutions and distinguish actions prosecuted from
permissible tax planning from Internal Revenue Service (Service) perspective); see
also Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq
Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 230 (July 10, 2000) (noting the general discomfort of many
leading tax practitioners with the government's emphasis on penalties and case-by-
case discretion to define tax abuse and combat tax shelters). Not everyone is
dismayed by the government's aggressive posture. See, e.g., Darryll K. Jones,
Criminalizing Tax Shelters and the "Damn-Well" Reflex, 110 TAx NOTEs 285 (Jan. 16,
2006) (defending criminal prosecutions of tax shelter promoters generally).
8 Code section 6662 defines a "tax shelter" as "a partnership or other entity, an
investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant
purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion
of Federal income tax." I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii). Other provisions of the Code
offer definitions of the same term. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 461(i)(3) (adopting a broader
definition inclusive of that of Code § 6662); I.R.C. § 4965(e) (defining "prohibited tax
shelter transaction" by cross reference to other terms defined in Code section 6707A).
None of these definitions has proven particularly useful in combating abusing tax
shelters; and some transactions that the government labels as tax shelters have
"worked," meaning at the very least that the courts recognized their consistency with
existing law, even if Congress subsequently amends the tax laws to alter the
consequences of such transactions. See infra note 12 and related text. Hence, Treas.
Reg. § 1.6011-4 more broadly identifies several categories of transactions that
participating taxpayers must report to assist the Service in ferreting out abusive tax
shelters, only one of which is listed transactions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a), (b)
(2006). Yet while the reportable transaction regulations are targeted at tax shelter
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shelters are a big problem, 9 they disagree over precisely how to
distinguish ordinary non-shelter tax planning from tax shelters, and
legitimate from abusive tax shelters. ° The federal tax laws are
enormously complex. Reasonable people disagree all the time over
their meaning. The Internal Revenue Service's (Service's) win/loss
record in recent civil tax shelter cases is not great." Drawing the line
between the use of shelters in legitimate tax planning and abusive tax
shelters is just plain hard.
A significant contributor to the problem of tax shelters, of course,
is a tax code rife with ambiguity. Tax shelters in general are designed
to take advantage of a lack of clarity in the law. There is always a
possibility in litigating a tax shelter case that a court will find the Code
to be clear on the issue in question. In many if not most such cases,
however, it seems safe to assume that a reviewing court would find the
activity, tax advisors generally recognize that many ordinary business transactions fall
within the scope of these disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Michael Schler, Effects of
Anti-Tax Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Practice, 109 TAx NOTES 915, 916-17 (Nov.
14, 2005) (concluding that "for most tax advisers, the vast majority (if not all) of the
transactions that fall in those categories are normal business transactions, not tax
shelters").
9 For example, Shaviro states:
The Treasury has argued, and many practitioners agree, that at present we
face a crisis in which undesirable transactions that would undoubtedly be
shut down on detection (even if they work under current law) are
compromising the entire corporate income tax, and perhaps generating
broader disrespect for the tax system.
Shaviro, supra note 7, at 230.
10 See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public
Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 1000-02 (2006)
(summarizing academic efforts to define "tax shelter"); Michael S. Powlen & Raj
Tanden, Corporate Tax Shelters or Plus (a Change, Plus C'est La Meme Chose, 736
PLI/TAx 11, 19-21 (2006) (discussing the difficulties in defining "tax shelter").
" Compare, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (rejecting contingent liability transaction), and Boca Investerings P'ship v.
United States, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting contingent installment sale tax
shelter), and BB&T Corp. v. United States, No. 1: 04CV00941 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 4,
2007), slip opinion available at 2007 WL 37798 (disallowing deductions associated
with Lease-In/Lease-Out tax shelter), with Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding shelter against
government challenge), and United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Commissioner, 254
F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding captive insurance program). See also Marvin A.
Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1940 (2005) (noting the Service's mixed record in litigating
tax shelters).
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12Code susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.
In the civil context, depending upon the format of the Service's
interpretation, a finding of statutory ambiguity typically means that
the reviewing court should apply one or another doctrine of judicial
deference in evaluating the government's interpretation: either the
strong, mandatory Chevron deference, 3 the slightly less deferential
Skidmore deference standard," or perhaps the tax-specific National
Muffler deference.15 Whichever of these review standards applies, the
resulting judicial deference gives the government a distinct advantage
over the taxpayer in persuading the courts to adopt the government's
interpretations of the Code. 6  Consequently, these deference
doctrines are useful tools in the Service's effort to maintain the
integrity of the tax laws.
In criminal cases, by contrast, the rule of lenity applies to resolve
disputes over interpreting ambiguous statutes. 7  This canon of
construction generally requires courts reviewing ambiguous statutes in
the context of criminal cases to construe those statutes in the
12 To be clear, the variety of statutory ambiguity giving rise to the issues
discussed herein should not be mistaken for the lack of statutory clarity that raises
vagueness doctrine concerns. Although related to the rule of lenity, vagueness
doctrine precludes altogether the enforcement of "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). Uncertainty over whether the use of the term
"liabilities" in Code section 752 includes contingent in addition to fixed liabilities, for
example, may reflect statutory ambiguity but simply does not present a vagueness
doctrine concern. Of course, in application, the line between lenity and the vagueness
doctrine is not always so clear. See WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 2.2 (2d ed.) (noting that "there is no exact borderline which can be drawn between a
statute which is merely ambiguous and one which is unconstitutionally vague.").
Nevertheless, whatever the Code's limitations, vagueness is unlikely to be one of
them.
13 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
44 (1984).
14 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
15 See Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. Commissioner, 440 U.S. 472,476-77 (1979).
See generally, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1542-55 (2006)
(discussing the applicability of these doctrines to Treasury regulations).
16 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (1998)
(documenting study finding that 73% of appellate court applications of the Chevron
deference standard accepted the agency's interpretation).
17 See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955).
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defendant's favor. 18 Yet, the Supreme Court has applied the rule of
lenity to resolve not only criminal cases but also civil cases where the
statute in question could be used as a basis for criminal prosecution. 9
Several scholars have recognized tension between doctrines of
20judicial deference and the rule of lenity. Some of the Supreme
Court's opinions hint that lenity may well "trump" deference
principles in civil cases involving regulatory statutes, like the Code,
that provide for both criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms.
Other opinions of the Court hint the opposite. By pursuing tax
lawyers and accountants criminally for planning and promoting tax
shelters, the executive branch is plunging headlong into this bramble
bush and may actually push the courts to decide between lenity and
deference. The question that arises, therefore, is whether the courts
could really choose the taxpayer-friendly rule of lenity over the pro-
government deference doctrines for Code interpretation in civil as
well as criminal enforcement actions. Such a choice could
substantially undermine the government's efforts to protect the
integrity of the Code far beyond the narrow scope of abusive tax
shelters.
My purpose here is not to defend KPMG, the tax shelters it
promoted, or indeed the merits of any particular transaction. Rather,
my intent is to sound a note of caution: criminalizing tax shelter
activities may have unforeseen consequences for more mundane tax
enforcement efforts. To elaborate my concern, this essay proceeds in
three parts. Part II presents the tension between the rule of lenity and
deference to agency interpretations of statutes in greater depth,
surveying the relevant judicial doctrines and their intersection and
18 See, e.g., Bass, 404 U.S. at 347-48; Bell, 349 U.S. at 83-84; LAFAVE, supra note
12; NORMAN J. SINGER, 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.3 (6th ed.
2001).
19 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1
(2004); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992); Crandon v.
United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990); see also discussion infra notes 64-87 and
accompanying text (discussing these cases).
20 See, e.g., Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 38-47 (2006); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 128-34 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2115-16 (1990). But see Dan Kahan, Is Chevron
Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 507-11 (1996) (suggesting
that lenity and deference do not have to be mutually exclusive); Patricia G. Chapman,
Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Senza Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference
or The Rule of Lenity, 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 115, 165-67 (1998) (proposing an approach
for reconciling the two doctrines).
[Vol. 26:905
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implications. Space limitations preclude a thorough exploration of
how the Supreme Court should address the concerns raised herein.
Nevertheless, Part III considers briefly various ways the Court might
resolve a direct clash between lenity and deference. Finally, Part IV
raises the possibility that the greater exercise of prosecutorial
discretion might either avoid forcing the Court's hand or potentially
influence the Court toward an outcome favorable to the government
and the integrity of the Code.
II. THE PROBLEM
The Code includes many delegations of authority to the Treasury
Department more or less to make regulatory law out of whole cloth.
Section 1502 represents a classic example, giving the Secretary of the
Treasury the authority to develop whatever regulations he deems
necessary to reflect clearly the income tax liability of a group of
affiliated corporations filing a single return, whether or not such
regulations differ from those that apply to corporations filing
separately.21 There can be no clash between the rule of lenity and
judicial deference doctrines under such circumstances. Rather, the
courts must defer to Treasury's regulations, because Congress has
given Treasury and the courts nothing to interpret, and the only law to
apply is that promulgated by Treasury.
On the other hand, occasionally Congress enacts a criminal
statute with "terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."' 2 The
Supreme Court holds such statutes unconstitutional and void for
21
vagueness on due process grounds. Of course, distinguishing
between unconstitutional vagueness and ordinary ambiguity is often
difficult.24  Nevertheless, whatever the Code's limitations,
unconstitutional vagueness is not likely to be among them.
To be clear, the variety of statutory ambiguity that implicates the
tension between lenity and deference should not be mistaken either
for radical statutory indeterminacy or the utter lack of statutory
21 See I.R.C. § 1502.
22 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,266 (1997).
23 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51 (1999) (rejecting criminal
statute as unconstitutionally vague); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-61 (1983)
(invalidating penal statute on vagueness grounds).
24 See LAFAVE, supra note 12, at § 2.2 (noting that "there is no exact borderline




clarity that raises vagueness doctrine concerns. Instead, the problem
at hand arises when a provision in the Code, or any other regulatory
statute with both criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms, is
susceptible of two or more identifiable and equally defensible
alternative interpretations. The question in such cases is whether the
courts will automatically choose the more lenient or taxpayer-friendly
of those options or defer to the government's preference for a
different choice. This Part II explores this problem.
A. Competing Doctrines: Lenity Versus Deference
To understand the dilemma fully, one first must appreciate the
competing legal doctrines governing statutory interpretation and
judicial review. In the criminal context, the doctrine at issue is the
rule of lenity, one of the classic canons of statutory construction. The
civil context is more complicated, particularly in the tax area.
The doctrine or rule of lenity provides generally that criminal
25
statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.
Hence, the courts commonly mention two rationales as supporting
lenity as a canon of statutory construction. The first is that people
deserve fair warning that particular activities will subject them to
16
criminal penalties. The second is that legislatures, rather than courts,
27
should be responsible for defining precisely which actions are crimes.
Lenity is an old rule. In earlier centuries, the courts applied the
doctrine quite broadly, largely because the sentence for most crimes
was death.2' That no longer being the case, the courts unsurprisingly
• • 29
have narrowed the scope of the doctrine's applicability. The courts
will not apply the rule of lenity in the context of a criminalS 30
prosecution merely because statutory ambiguity exists. The courts
will employ first their myriad interpretive tools to discern clear
See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955); see
also LAFAVE, supra note 12, at § 2.2; SINGER, supra note 18, at § 59.3.
26 See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985); Bass, 404 U.S. at 348; McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
27 See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 150 (1998); Crandon, 494
U.S. at 158; Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 131 (1990); Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.
28 See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Criminal Statutes, 48
HARV. L. REV. 748, 749-51 (1935) (detailing origins of the rule of lenity).
29 See Solan, supra note 20, at 102-08 (identifying Justice Frankfurter as
originating a narrower approach to lenity).
30 See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998).
[Vol. 26:905
Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG
congressional intent.31 In so doing, they will not necessarily adopt the
narrowest interpretation of a statute where clearly articulated
legislative goals suggest a broader meaning.32 Thus, "[t]he rule of
lenity applies only if, 'after seizing everything from which aid can be
derived,' ... [the reviewing court] can make 'no more than a guess as
to what Congress intended.' 3   Nevertheless, the courts have an
"instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the
lawmaker has clearly said that they should." 34  If a court cannot
ascertain that Congress clearly intended the defendant's actions to be
criminally sanctionable, then the doctrine of lenity requires the court
to interpret the statute in the defendant's favor.
Judicial review of agency interpretations of law in the civil context
follows an entirely different, almost opposite, path from the rule of
lenity. In this context, where Congress's intent is not clear and a
statute is ambiguous, judicial review emphasizes deference to the
government to one degree or another, although there is some debate
over precisely which deference standard applies in the tax context.
The most widely known deference doctrine is that of Chevron
36U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., with its two-
part inquiry for evaluating agency interpretations of law: first, whether
the statute being interpreted clearly and unambiguously resolves the
issue; and if not, whether the administering agency's interpretation of
31 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) ("Instead, we have
always reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about
a statute's intended scope even after resort to 'the language and structure, legislative
history, and motivating policies' of the statute."); see also Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 134-
37 (considering related statutes, dictionary definitions, analogous cases, and
legislative history); United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 490-95 (1997) (evaluating
statutory text, common law use, and statutory history); Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. 223, 228-35 (1993) (weighing statutory scheme and context, dictionary
definitions, and common use); see also SINGER, supra note 18, at § 59.8 (listing
relevant considerations).
32 See, e.g., United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 306 n.6 (1992); Dixson v.
United States, 465 U.S. 482, 500 n.19 (1984); see also SINGER, supra note 18, at § 59.6
(listing relevant considerations).
33 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138 (quoting several cases); see also Callanan v.
United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) ("The rule [of lenity] comes into operation at
the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.").
34 HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 209 (1967).
35 See generally, e.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96, 172-
81 (2006) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (analyzing the disagreement over judicial deference
in tax cases); Hickman, supra note 15, at 1556-63 (discussing the debate).
36 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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the statute is a permissible one.37 The Court's more recent decision in
United States v. Mead Corp. instructs that Chevron deference only
applies if Congress has given the agency in question the authority to
bind regulated parties with "the force of law" and if the agency has in
fact "exercised that authority.,
38
According to Mead, where Chevron deference does not apply, the
courts are still required to employ the only somewhat less deferential
standard of Skidmore v. Swift.39 Under Skidmore, a reviewing court
should evaluate for itself the appropriate level of judicial deference to
extend toward an agency's interpretation of the law by considering
several factors, including but not limited to "the thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
the power to persuade, if lacking power to control."40
The Chevron and Skidmore deference doctrines have divergent
justifications and serve different purposes. As the Supreme Court in
Mead affirmed, Chevron "rests on a presumption about congressional
intent," that Congress at least implicitly wanted an agency rather than
the courts to be the primary interpreter of a particular statutory
scheme.4 Thus, Chevron deference is both comparatively limited in
scope and yet mandatory where a court finds the requisite delegation
and exercise thereof. By contrast, Skidmore is a doctrine of judicial
prudence, acknowledging that the courts often lack the resources and
expertise to evaluate and appreciate fully the consequences of
complex statutory schemes, and that agencies sometimes are simply
better positioned to assess and apply alternative statutory
37 See id. at 843-44.
38 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001).
39 See id. at 234-35; see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-82 (2005) (reiterating this aspect of Mead's analysis);
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (foreshadowing Mead's
application of Skidmore).
40 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Citing Skidmore, the Mead
court paraphrased these factors in saying that agency interpretations not entitled to
Chevron deference should be evaluated based upon "the degree of the agency's care,
its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the
agency's position." Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228. See generally Colin S. Diver,
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PENN. L. REV. 549 (1985)
(analyzing at length the state of judicial review pre-Chevron under the Skidmore
regime).
4 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231 n.11 (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001)).
[Vol. 26:905
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• • 42interpretations. A court satisfied that an agency is not otherwise
behaving arbitrarily or unreasonably is often sensible to defer to the
agency's greater expertise and, sometimes, extensive interpretive
efforts. 43 Nevertheless, Skidmore leaves the degree of deference to
the reviewing court's judgment and discretion.
There is some debate over the applicability of Mead, Chevron,
and Skidmore in the tax area. A few years prior to deciding Chevron,
in National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. Commissioner, the Supreme
Court articulated a standard for deference in tax cases that seems toS 44
incorporate elements of both Chevron and Skidmore. National
Muffler speaks in terms of delegation and "serious deference" yet
simultaneously appears to leave the degree of deference to the court's
evaluation of various factors.4 ' The circuit courts of appeal and the
Tax Court are divided on the relationship between Chevron and
National Muffler,46  and scholarly attempts to resolve the
47jurisprudential mess have failed similarly to achieve consensus.
So long as the meaning and role of National Muffler in the
broader deference doctrine scheme remains unclear, the relationship
between lenity and National Muffler is even more indeterminate.
Nevertheless, nothing about the National Muffler approach to
deference suggests that reconciling lenity with that deference doctrine
42 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
43 Where Skidmore or even Chevron deference applies to an agency's legal
interpretation, the courts still evaluate agency action for adequacy of process under
the arbitrary and capricious review standard of APA section 706(2)(A) and the hard
look doctrine. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983) (internal citations omitted); see also Nat'l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-82 (2005) (discussing
relationship between Chevron and hard look review); Martin v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157-58 (1991) (noting applicability of both
Skidmore and hard look review).
44 See Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 475-77 (1979).
41 Id. at 476.
46 See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2001)
(acknowledging a split and reserving the question); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commissioner,
245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) (same).
47 See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 81-83
(2003); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 731, 758 (2002); Irving Salem et al., Report of the Task Force on
Judicial Deference, 57 TAx LAw. 717, 724-26 (2004); Edward J. Schnee & W. Eugene
Seago, Deference Issues in the Tax Law: Mead Clarifies the Chevron Rule - Or Does
It?, 96 J. TAX'N 366, 371-72 (2002).
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would deviate significantly from doing so with Chevron or Skidmore.
I have argued elsewhere, moreover, that National Muffler represents
nothing more than a particularly articulate expression of the Court's
more general views about Skidmore and judicial deference in the
years leading up to its decision in Chevron and, thus, that National
Muffler retains no significance independent of the
Mead/Chevron/Skidmore framework.49 Accordingly, in my view, the
following analysis of the relationship between Chevron, Skidmore,
and the rule of lenity incorporates National Muffler deference as well.
The difference between the lenity and deference doctrines is not
merely in how they resolve statutory ambiguity, but more
fundamentally how courts applying them perceive the task at hand. In
its lenity jurisprudence, the Court emphasizes conclusive resolution of
statutory meaning. ° If a statute is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, and thus ambiguous, the reviewing court must choose
between the potential options. The rule of lenity operates as a tie
breaker, guiding the court's interpretive choice; but the Court's goal
in applying the doctrine is "to help give authoritative meaning to
statutory language., 1  Thus, to a court thinking in lenity terms, an
48 It is possible, however, that an argument may exist for treating tax differently
than other regulatory contexts with respect to this particular issue. The courts have
on occasion recognized a canon of construing ambiguous tax provisions against the
drafter. See, e.g., United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 839
(2001) (Thomas, J. concurring and Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting the canon and citing
several cases). Many question the ongoing vitality of this canon. See Steve R.
Johnson, Should Ambiguous Revenue Laws Be Construed In Favor of Taxpayers?, 10
APR NEV. LAW. 15, 15-16 (2002) (surveying the canon's history). Moreover, like
lenity, such a rule is arguably inconsistent with the notion of judicial deference toward
Treasury or Service interpretations of the Code regularly counseled by the courts.
The Court expressly relied on Chevron twice in post-Chevron tax cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001); Atl. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1991); United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246
n.4 (1985). Nevertheless, the potential for combining this doctrine with that of lenity
remains an interesting proposition to consider.
49 See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1589.
50 See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005) (describing the
Court's task as choosing between two plausible interpretations); Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1991) (emphasizing that lenity is a rule of statutory
construction and not a general policy of leniency toward defendants).
51 United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 n.10 (1992);
see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (emphasizing consistency of
interpretation); Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 205 (1998) (stressing
"uniformity in the interpretation of criminal statutes").
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ambiguous statute ultimately can only have one meaning: the more
52lenient one.
By contrast, the Chevron doctrine in particular is premised on an
assumption of interpretive flexibility on the part of executive branch
or agency officials.53 By this thinking, statutory ambiguity reflects the
opportunity for agency policy choice.54 If a statute supports more than
one interpretation and Chevron applies, then a reviewing court must
defer to the government's preference among the permissible
alternatives, even if the court thinks another interpretation might be
better. If Skidmore applies, then a court has more flexibility to
overrule an agency's choice. Regardless, both doctrines leave room
for an agency to change its mind and pick a different interpretation, so
long as it explains its basis for doing so.55 Moreover, after the
Supreme Court's recent decision in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, an agency can
even replace an interpretation adopted previously by the courts.56
Thus, interpreting ambiguous statutes in the civil, regulatory context is
much more focused on policy choice and flexibility, with agencies
making the interpretive decisions and courts primarily policing
agencies for arbitrariness rather than intruding into the policy-making
arena. In short, even under Skidmore, consistency of interpretation is
only relevant as a factor in evaluating the reasonableness of agency
action rather than as an end in itself.
52 Of course, one lower court's interpretation does not necessarily bind another
lower court. Nevertheless, a lower court thinking in lenity terms presumably
endeavors to discern the one meaning it believes a higher court applying the same
rule would find to be the "correct" one.
53 See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 980-82 (2005) (describing "the whole point of Chevron" as to give agencies "the
discretion provided by" statutory ambiguity to change interpretations "in response to
changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations").
54 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-
45 (1984) (linking statutory ambiguity to policy choice).
55 Although Skidmore includes consistency of agency interpretation among its
evaluative factors, no one Skidmore factor is determinative, and the courts do defer
under Skidmore to thoroughly considered and well reasoned changes in
interpretation. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States, 425 F.3d 1381, 1385-
86 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (deferring to agency's reclassification of imported merchandise
under Skidmore); Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126, 1136
(Fed. Cir. 2001); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 6.4 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that "no single factor is dispositive" in Skidmore analysis).
56 545 U.S. 967, 980-83 (2005) (holding that Chevron applied and that the courts
must defer to a reasonable FCC construction of the Communications Act that
differed from an earlier appellate court interpretation).
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B. Case Law at the Crossroads
Although the courts have barely touched on the relationship
between Skidmore deference and lenity," they have clearly rejected
the applicability of Chevron deference in criminal cases, for two58
reasons. First, the Department of Justice, which handles criminal
prosecutions for the federal government and in so doing interprets
criminal statutes, nevertheless does not "administer" the criminal
code.5 9 Justice Scalia made this observation more than a decade
before the Court decided Mead; but Mead's emphasis on
congressional delegation of administrative authority as a prerequisite
for Chevron deference merely adds weight to this rationale. 60 Second,
in enforcing criminal statutes, government prosecutors have an
incentive to construe them broadly, meaning that to defer to such
interpretations would "replac[e] the doctrine of lenity with a doctrine
of severity., 61 While he did not mention Skidmore deference by
name, Justice Scalia identified just this reason for denying "any
persuasive effect" to the Justice Department's interpretations of the
62
criminal code. It is well known that Justice Scalia regards Skidmore
deference as anachronistic;63 but his second reason for denying
" The Supreme Court has never discussed this relationship, and the courts of
appeals have barely mentioned it as well. See United States v. One TRW, Model
M14, 7.62 Caliber Rifle, 441 F.3d 416, 419-20 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the
issue implicitly, but finding all of Chevron, Skidmore, and lenity to be inapplicable).
58 See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e have never thought that the interpretation of those charged with
prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference."); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of
Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1031 (10th Cir. 2003)
("Because the Johnson Act is a federal criminal statute enforced by the United States
Department of Justice, we owe no deference to the NIGC's construction."); United
States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (concluding inappropriateness
of deference in criminal cases); see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to
Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 490 (1996) (acknowledging the
proposition despite arguing for Chevron's application in the criminal context).
'9 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1092-93 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Crandon); Dolfi v. Pontesso, 156 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 1998)
(same).
60 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-31 (2001).
61 Crandon, 494 U.S. at 177.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J.
dissenting); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J.
concurring); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259-60 (1991) (Scalia, J.
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Chevron deference in criminal cases logically extends to the Skidmore
deference doctrine as well.
In Crandon v. United States, the Supreme Court went a small step
further than merely applying lenity instead of Chevron deference in
criminal cases.64 Crandon concerned severance compensation paid by
Boeing, Inc. to several employees who were resigning to take
positions with the federal government. 6' A provision in the criminal
code precludes anyone outside the government from paying and any
federal government employee from receiving "any contribution to or
supplementation of salary, as compensation for" services rendered as
66
a government employee. The government contended that Boeing's
severance payments to its outgoing employees fell within the scope of
this prohibition.6' Rather than criminally prosecuting Boeing and the
employees, however, the government instead pursued a civil action for
monetary relief and impoundment of the compensation paid.
68
Resolving the case required evaluating the government's
69interpretation of the criminal code. In so doing, the Court noted that
both the government's reading of the statute and Boeing's were
consistent with statutory language, history, and goals. ° Accordingly,
the Court concluded that "because the governing standard is set forth
in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage."71
Thus, the Court rejected the government's broader interpretation of
the statute and held in favor of Boeing and its former employees.72
The Court broadened the scope of lenity's applicability a bit
further still in United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.73 Like
Crandon, Thompson/Center Arms was a civil case.74 Yet whereas
concurring).
64 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990).
65 See id. at 154-55.
66 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1990); see also Crandon, 494 U.S. at 154 & n.1 (quoting
statutory language).
67 See Crandon, 494 U.S. at 156.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 158 (defining the question as "whether [section] 209(a) applies to a
severance payment that is made to encourage the payee to accept Government
employment, but that is made before the payee becomes a Government employee").
70 See id. at 159-68.
71 Id. at 158.
72 See id. at 168.
73 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
74 Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 506-07.
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Crandon required interpreting the criminal code, Thompson/Center
Arms concerned an interpretation of a regulatory statute - the
National Firearms Act.75 In fact, though not involving the income tax
laws, Thompson/Center Arms was a tax case involving an excise tax
76provision in the Code.
Among other things, the National Firearms Act imposes a per-
unit tax upon manufacturers of "firearms" and for this purpose
defines that term to include short-barreled rifles but not long-barreled
rifles. Thompson/Center Arms packaged and sold together a pistol,
shoulder stock, and 21-inch barrel that a purchaser could assemble to
create either a short- or long-barreled rifle. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms concluded that, in packaging and selling such a
kit, Thompson/Center Arms "made" a "firearm" subject to the per-
unit tax. Thompson/Center Arms paid the tax and sued for a refund,
challenging the Bureau's interpretation of the statute.
The National Firearms Act provides for both civil and criminal
enforcement of its provisions.77 The National Firearms Act also
requires a manufacturer of firearms to register with the Secretary of
the Treasury each "firearm" that it "makes," with failure to do so
78punishable by imprisonment and a fine. Thus, while the case before
the Court was a civil action involving the respondent's tax liability, the
Court observed that the government could, in the future, rely upon
the exact same statutory term in question as the basis for criminal
prosecution. Citing Crandon, the Court deemed it "proper, therefore,
to apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in
Thompson/Center's favor.,
79
Since deciding Thompson/Center Arms, the Court has reiterated
its holding with respect to lenity's scope. In Leocal v. Ashcroft, an
immigrant deportation case, the Court found that the relevant
provision of the Immigration and Nationalization Act unambiguously
supported the immigrant Leocal's claim.80  The Court further
observed that lenity would require it to interpret the statute in the
petitioner's favor regardless because the provision in question had
"both criminal and noncriminal applications."81 Citing
75 See id.; I.R.C. § 5801.
7' Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 506-07.
71 Id. at 517.
71 Id. at 507-08.
79 Id. at 518; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005) (noting
same); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (noting same).
80 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.
81 See id. at 11-12 n.8.
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Thompson/Center Arms, the Court declared that, "[b]ecause we must
interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application
in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies. 8 2 In
Clark v. Martinez, the Court made a similar point. "It is not at all
unusual to give a statute's ambiguous language a limiting construction
called for by one of the statute's applications, even though other of
the statute's applications, standing alone, would not support the same
limitation. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must
govern.
83
Nevertheless, the Court's trek down the slippery slope of lenity's
applicability is not unidirectional. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Greater Oregon, the Court was faced with yet
another civil case involving a hybrid regulatory statute with both civil
84
and criminal enforcement potential - the Endangered Species Act.
The regulated parties against whom the government sought to apply
the Act cited Thompson/Center Arms and lenity as requiring a
85
narrower interpretation of the statute. Here, however, the
government's position was articulated in a longstanding regulation,
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking and published
86in the Code of Federal Regulations. The Court rejected the rule of
lenity, employed Chevron deference, and distinguished from
Thompson/Center Arms on the ground that the EPA's regulation
provided regulated parties the desired notice that their actions would
subject them to criminal penalties.
In summary, it is clear that the Court does not limit lenity's scope
to criminal cases involving interpretations of the criminal code. With
Crandon, the Court concluded that the rule of lenity is properly
applied in civil cases interpreting the criminal code; and in
Thompson/Center Arms Co., the Court extended the doctrine even
further to a civil case interpreting a regulatory statute that could also
support criminal prosecution. However, in Sweet Home, another civil
case involving a hybrid regulatory statute, the Court expressly
rejected the rule of lenity in favor of Chevron deference,
distinguishing from Thompson/Center Arms on the ground that the
EPA's interpretation was communicated in a longstanding regulation.
92 Id.
83 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (citing both Leocal and Thompson/Center Arms).
84 515 U.S. 687, 690, 721 (1995).
85 See id. at 704 n.18.
See id. at 703-04.
8 See id. at 704 n.18.
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The Court's approach in these cases, and particularly in Sweet
Home, reveals a tension between the fair warning and legislative
function policies driving the rule of lenity. If fair warning is the
Court's primary concern in deciding when to apply the rule of lenity,
then the line the Court drew between lenity and deference in Sweet
Home is a logical one. In the modern era, the courts have supported
congressional power to delegate to administrative agencies what is
essentially legislative authority to make the law, albeit within the
parameters of the relevant statutory language."' Thus, when an
agency promulgates regulatory language interpreting a statute it
administers, then unless the regulation exceeds the scope of the
agency's mandate or is procedurally flawed, the regulation will carry
89the same legal force as the statute. In other words, while the statute
may be ambiguous, the law is not, and fair warning concerns are
satisfied.90
The Court's Sweet Home reasoning is much less consistent with
lenity's policy of requiring the legislature to decide which actions are
criminally punishable, however. Most regulatory matters are
susceptible to good-faith disagreements over how best to accomplish
legislative objectives. Congress adopts broad regulatory statutes and
delegates the responsibility for administering them to agencies in part
because agencies have more expertise and are thus better positioned
to evaluate alternative methods for accomplishing statutory goals.9'
88 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 488-89 (2001)
(Stevens, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (accusing the majority
of disingenuousness for declining to recognize such delegations as of legislative
authority); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[O]ur jurisprudence
has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society,
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."); see also
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099-100, 2103-09 (2004) (discussing
congressional delegation of legislative power and the untenability of the
nondelegation doctrine).
89 See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.1 (4th
ed. 2002) (describing agency legislative rules as having "the same binding effect as
statutes").
90 See Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's a Crime?: Chevron Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1, 42-60 (1996) (arguing that judicial deference can be employed to
satisfy fair warning concerns).
91 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (discussing agency expertise as a reason for delegating administrative
authority).
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Hence, except to the most committed ideologues, an agency's choice
among reasonable statutory interpretations merely reflects the
agency's judgment as to which of the available alternatives will best
serve congressional intent. By contrast, deciding that particular
actions should be criminally punishable is an act of collective moral
judgment and condemnation.92 As designated representatives of the
people, members of Congress are both more in touch with communal
perceptions of "right" and "wrong" and more accountable to the
public for the moral judgments they make than agencies are. While
the Supreme Court has not explicitly made this link, other courts and
scholars have highlighted the moral element of criminalization as a
further reason for not extending judicial deference to Justice
Department interpretations of the criminal code.93 Yet by deferring to
the EPA's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, the Court in
Sweet Home arguably allowed the EPA to step directly into that role
of moral arbiter.
In addition, Sweet Home leaves open the question of what
happens when a regulated party finds itself in a situation with an
ambiguous statute and without such clear and legally-binding
regulatory guidance. Agencies often interpret statutes for the first
time in the process of enforcing them. Alternatively, case law from
one or more lower courts may offer guidance but not bind taxpayers
See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 149-50 (1998) (raising this
concern); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259 (1992) (same); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (same); see also United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291,
309 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (objecting even to the use of legislative history to
determine statutory meaning before applying the rule of lenity for similar reasons).
93 See, e.g., United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(observing that the interpretation of criminal statutes is "far outside Chevron
territory"); Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1, 60 (2006) (observing that "the agency has no particular expertise in
determining community values"); Lisa Sachs, Strict Construction of the Rule of Lenity
in the Interpretation of Environmental Crimes, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 631-34
(1996) (contending that the "special judgments" involved in defining criminal acts are
outside the scope of agency expertise); Brian Slocum, RICO and the Legislative
Supremacy Approach to Federal Criminal Lawmaking, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 639, 651
n.71 (2000) (arguing that, "in situations involving the moral condemnation of the
community and the loss of liberty," legislatures rather than agencies should decide
which actions are criminal). But see Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag
Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997) (arguing generally that regulatory matters are not so morally
neutral); Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within
the Executive Branch, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1998) (reasoning that the
executive branch is better suited to shaping the contours of federal criminal law).
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from other jurisdictions. In still other instances, agencies resolve
statutory ambiguity through less formal, legally non-binding formats.
In the tax context, revenue rulings and notices particularly serve this
purpose.
In light of Sweet Home, where Treasury has promulgated a
regulation that pre-dates and clearly negates a given tax shelter, it
seems unlikely that a court would apply the rule of lenity to disregard
that regulation. Whether abusive or not, cutting-edge tax transactions
and shelters tend not to ignore established regulations, however.
Instead, they target ambiguities in the regulations themselves, or
provisions in the Code for which there are no established regulations.
Thus, statutory interpretation in the tax shelter area falls squarely
within the realm of the open question created by Thompson/Center
Arms Co.
Post-Mead, it is apparent that the Court's post-Chevron
perceptions regarding congressional delegation do not extend to
agency interpretations lacking the force and effect of law. An agency
employing such interpretive formats is not exercising congressionally-
delegated authority to make the law, but rather is merely interpreting
the law in its executive enforcement capacity. Hence, while Skidmore
or, in tax cases, National Muffler may apply to grant the agency some
degree of deference, any claim that such formats render the law
unambiguous is substantially weaker.
In short, the limited reasoning of Sweet Home - that a long-
standing regulation renders the law clear even if the statute is not -
simply does not extend to nonbinding agency interpretations like
revenue rulings, notices, and chief counsel advice. Moreover, where
the Service first advances its interpretation of the tax laws either
through or simultaneously with enforcement efforts, as is often the
case with respect to tax shelters, the rationale of Sweet Home would
be wholly inapplicable.
C. KPMG: A Case in Point
The KPMG case potentially brings this issue to the forefront.
Known officially in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York as United States v. Stein, this case involves the
criminal prosecution of several former partners and managers of the
KPMG accounting firm as well as attorney R.J. Ruble, a former
partner in the New York law firm of Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood,
for conspiracy to defraud the Service in connection with the BLIPS,
[Vol. 26:905
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FLIP, OPIS, and SOS tax shelters.94
It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the legal validity of
these tax shelters, whether in template form or as executed with
respect to individual taxpayers. The KPMG shelters are quite
complicated. There are many factual and legal bases on which they
could be declared legally invalid. Among other things, however, the
BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS shelters all are premised upon at least one
interpretation of arguably ambiguous statutory language that, in turn,
lacks regulatory clarification.9
1. BLIPS
The BLIPS, or Bond Linked Issue Premium Structures, tax
shelter was designed to create a sizeable capital loss for a U.S.
taxpayer with a substantial existing or anticipated capital gain to
offset.96  To accomplish this goal, parties to the transaction would
94 The indictment also alleges violations of Code section 7201, which makes a
felony any "willful[] attempt[ ] in any manner to evade or defeat any tax" under the
Code, and Code section 7206(1) and (2), which criminalize both willfully making false
statements in connection with a tax return and willfully aiding in the preparation of a
false tax return. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Stein, N. S1 05 Crim.
0888(LAK), 2005 WL 4168176 (Oct. 17, 2005).
95 The SOS shelter addressed in the KPMG indictment actually represents
several different tax shelters, all of which generated tax losses through pre-arranged
steps, but under different names and agreements rather than the template approach
of BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants'
Joint Motion to Strike References to the "SOS" Strategies in the Indictment, United
States v. Stein, No. 05 Cr. 888(LAK), 2005 WL 4156215 (2005) (arguing that SOS is
not one but several different transaction structures); Superseding Indictment, United
States v. Stein, N. 51 05 Crim. 0888(LAK), 2005 WL 4168176 (Oct. 17, 2005)
(including under the SOS indictment transactions labeled Short Option Strategy,
Spread Option Strategy, Split Option Strategy, SOS, Binary Option, Digital Option,
Gain Mitigator, Loss Generator, COINS, BEST, and FX Transaction). Space
constraints and comparative lack of readily available in-depth legal analysis preclude
discussion of all of the transaction structures that fall under the SOS label.
96 See MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF
ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS, FOUR KPMG CASE
STUDIES: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, AND 5C2, at Appendix A, 120, available at 2003 TNT
223-20 (Nov. 19, 2003) (hereinafter PSI TAX SHELTER REPORT). The Subcommitee
derived this report from hearings held in 2003. See U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The
Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals: Hearings Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs., 108th Cong. (2003) (four vols.) (hereinafter PSI Tax Shelter Hearings).
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follow a series of pre-established steps.97
First, a U.S. taxpayer would establish a single-member limited
liability company (LLC) to obtain a fixed-rate, non-recourse loan of
$100 with a seven-year term. In exchange for agreeing to pay a
substantially above-market rate of interest on that loan, the LLC
would receive from the bank an additional "loan premium" of $50,
equal to the net present value of all of the interest payments in excess
of a market rate of interest over the life of the loan. The LLC would
agree to pay a penalty equal to the unamortized loan premium if it
repaid the loan prior to the end of its term and would also accept
various restrictions on its use of the loan funds (intended to reduce
the bank's credit risk). After the LLC and the bank entered into the
loan, the LLC and two affiliates of the tax shelter promoter would
form a partnership. The LLC would contribute the loan proceeds and
loan premium totaling $150 in exchange for a 90% interest in the
partnership, and the partnership would assume the LLC's obligations
under the loan. The partnership would invest the loan proceeds in
low-risk investments. The partnership additionally would enter into a
swap transaction with the bank in which the partnership agreed to pay
a floating market rate on the loan and the bank agreed to pay the
original, above-market rate on the face amount of the loan. From the
perspective of the partnership, the swap would effectively reduce the
interest rate on the loan to a market-based rate. Finally, after several
weeks the partnership would unwind, repaying the loan plus the
prepayment penalty and distributing any remaining assets to its
partners, including the LLC.
Among other legal gray areas, the BLIPS transaction is designed
to exploit ambiguity in the meaning of the word "liabilities" as it is
used in section 752.98 Pursuant to sections 722 and 752, the U.S.
taxpayer (through the LLC) takes its partnership interest with a basis
equal to the cash contributed of $150 less the amount of liabilities
assumed by the partnership. 99 The interpretive question is whether,
for purposes of section 752, the amount of liabilities assumed is the
stated loan principal amount of $100 or the stated principal plus loan
97 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. (describing the structure and
declaring it abusive); PSI TAX SHELTER REPORT, supra note 96, at 111-21
(summarizing the BLIPS structure by name).
98 See KPMG Tax Opinion Letter Template Dated Dec. 31, 1999, 1 PSI Tax
Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 684, 705-09 (citing and discussing cases and
revenue rulings relevant to the BLIPS shelter).
99 See I.R.C. § 752(b).
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premium totaling $150.1°° In other words, is the loan premium a
liability as that term is used by section 752? If so, then the transaction
is more or less a wash for the U.S. taxpayer, as the liabilities assumed
by the partnership would equal the cash contributed to the
partnership, leaving the U.S. taxpayer at or near zero basis in its
partnership interest. If the premium is not a liability, however, the
U.S. taxpayer's basis in the partnership interest will be $50. When the
partnership unwinds and uses all of its cash to pay the premium as a
prepayment penalty in addition to the loan principal, the U.S.
taxpayer will realize a "loss" on its "investment" in the partnership of
$50. The Service maintains that the loan premium represents
additional debt and thus a liability for purposes of section 752.101
Proponents of the BLIPS shelter contend that the premium is at best a
contingent liability and point to cases and rulings in force at the time
that KPMG sold the shelters holding that contingent liabilities are not
liabilities under section 752.1°2
One problem for the government, however, is that section 752
does not define "liabilities," and the Treasury Department failed to
propose clarifying regulatory language until 2003, when it was already
battling the BLIPS shelter.' °3  At the time that KPMG actively
promoted the' BLIPS structure, legal guidance concerning the
meaning of "liabilities" under section 752 consisted of case law and a
few revenue rulings that arguably support KPMG's interpretation.0
In prosecuting the BLIPS shelter, the government relies heavily on
the retroactive application of Treas. Reg. section 1.752-6, which
100 See KPMG Tax Opinion Letter Template Dated Dec. 31, 1999, 1 PSI Tax
Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 684, 708-10 (applying law to BLIPS shelter facts).
... See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (explaining Service objections to
BLIPS shelter).
10 See KPMG Tax Opinion Letter Template Dated Dec. 31, 1999, 1 PSI Tax
Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 684, 708-10 (applying law to BLIPS shelter facts);
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike Allegations in
Counts One Through Forty of the Indictment, Pursuant to Rule 7(D) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States v. Stein, 1:05-cr-00888-LAK at 18-24
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006), 2006 WL 1868180; Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Memorandum In Support, Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v.
United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (No. 5:04-cv-00278-TJW), 2006
WL 2785819.
103 See T.D. 9062, 2003-2 C.B. 46 (adopting Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6T (2003));
Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 Fed. Reg. 37434 (proposed June 23, 2003)
(proposing regulations).
' See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608,
615-17 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
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Treasury both proposed and finalized years after KPMG sold the
BLIPS shelter.
10 5
The BLIPS shelter is susceptible to challenge on a variety of
grounds beyond the meaning of section 752, including a lack of
economic substance.'t° In Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v.
United States, the only federal district court to issue a substantive
opinion to date on the BLIPS structure resolved the interpretation of
section 752 in favor of the taxpayers.1°7 Klamath is a civil case, not a
criminal one, and the Klamath court did not address the question ofS • 108
lenity versus deference in reaching its conclusion. Instead, the
court's analysis focused primarily upon whether retroactively applying
the regulation interpreting section 752 represented an abuse of
discretion. °" In addition, the Klamath court made its determination
only in considering a motion for partial summary judgment."0 The
court ultimately decided the case in favor of the government on the
basis that the transactions as executed lacked economic substance,
though the court also found various civil penalties assessed by the
government to be inapplicable."'
In short, no court has yet employed lenity or deference to resolve
the interpretive question at the heart of the BLIPS transaction; and
the courts may be able to avoid doing so because of other issues the
shelter raises. Nevertheless, if one accepts the Klamath court's
holding that the government abused its discretion in retroactively
105 See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 (2005); T.D. 9207, 2005-1 C.B. 1344 (finalizing
temporary regulation and applying it retroactively to liabilities assumed after October
18, 1999); T.D. 9062, 2003-2 C.B. 46 (adopting temporary regulation); see also United
States' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in
Support of United States' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Klamath
Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (No.
5:04-cv-00278-TJW), at 23-25, 2006 WL 2785819 (relying on same regulation in civil
enforcement action).
106 See, e.g., Justice Department Bill of Particulars, United States v. Stein, 1:05-cr-
00888-LAK (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2006) (elaborating government allegations that BLIPS
was fraudulent as designed).
107 See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608,
625-26 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
108 The Klamath court did discuss the deference due to Treasury regulations
promulgated after the transaction in question took place, but instead applied an abuse
of discretion standard to invalidate the retroactive application of the regulation. See
id. at 625.
109 See id. at 625.
110 See id. at 610.
' See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, __ F. Supp. 2d __
2007 WL 283790 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
[Vol. 26:905
2007] Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG 929
applying Treas. Reg. section 1.752-6, and if taxpayers manage to
prevail on the economic substance and other issues, then liability -
whether criminal or civil - rests on how a court evaluates the
meaning of liabilities under section 752.
2. FLIP and OPIS
FLIP, or Foreign Leveraged Investment Program, and OPIS, or
Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy, are two names for what is
112essentially the same transaction structure. The purpose of this tax
shelter, much like BLIPS, was to generate a sizeable capital loss for a
U.S. taxpayer with a substantial existing or anticipated capital gain to
.- 113
offset. The FLIP and OPIS transactions employ nominally different
steps, but both rely on the same strategy of shifting asset basis to the
U.S. taxpayer from an offshore entity.
114
The basic transaction structure is as follows."5 KPMG would
establish an Offshore Shell Company in the Cayman Islands or
another tax haven with no corporate or income tax.16 Offshore Shell
would borrow funds on a nonrecourse basis from Foreign Bank and
use those funds to acquire Foreign Bank stock. Some weeks later, the
U.S. taxpayer would acquire an option to purchase an 85% ownership
112 See PSI TAX SHELTER REPORT, supra note 96, at 2-3, 43; Email from Jeff
Stein Dated Mar. 14, 1998, 2 PSI Tax Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 910-14
(comparing FLIP and OPIS shelters); Memorandum from Robert D. Simon Dated
Feb. 23, 1998, 2 PSI Tax Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 891, 893 (noting that
"[t]he only thing that really distinguishes OPIS (from FLIPS) from a tax perspective is
the use of an instrument that is purported to be a swap.").
113 See PSI TAX SHELTER REPORT, supra note 96, at 2-3, 42; Reasonable Basis
Analysis of the IRC Section 6111(c) Tax Shelter Registration Requirements for
"OPIS," 3 PSI Tax Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 2238 (providing overview of the
OPIS strategy).
... See, e.g., Email from Jeff Stein Dated Mar. 14, 1998, 2 PSI Tax Shelter
Hearings, supra note 96, at 910, 911 (noting basis-shift focus of both FLIP and OPIS);
see also Calvin H. Johnson, Tales from the KPMG Skunk Works: The Basis-Shift or
Defective-Redemption Shelter, 108 TAX NOTEs 431, 433 (July 25, 2005) (noting that
the FLIP and OPIS shelters share the same basis-shifting goal).
115 See KPMG Tax Opinion Letter Template Dated July 2, 1998, 2 PSI Tax
Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 990, 990-93 (summarizing FLIP/OPIS transaction
steps); see also Johnson, supra note 114, at 434-35 (same).
116 Planning documents for FLIP/OPIS and scholarly analysis of these shelters
assume the use of a Cayman entity. See, e.g., Memorandum from Bob Simon and
John Harris Dated Nov. 6, 1997, 2 PSI Tax Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 901;
KPMG Tax Opinion Letter Template Dated July 2, 1998, 2 PSI Tax Shelter Hearings,
supra note 96, at 990; Johnson, supra note 114, at 433-34.
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interest in Offshore Shell. The U.S. taxpayer separately would
acquire a small number of shares in Foreign Bank. Foreign Bank
would then redeem the shares held by Offshore Shell at the same time
that the U.S. taxpayer would purchase an option to acquire the exact
same number of Foreign Bank shares. Subsequently, the U.S.
taxpayer would sell both its Foreign Bank shares and its option to
acquire Foreign Bank shares.
A technical goal of this transaction was to treat the redemption of
the Foreign Bank shares as a dividend rather than a redemption for
tax purposes. " ' Ordinarily, under sections 302(a) and (b), a
"complete redemption" of shares such as seemingly occurred between
Foreign Bank and Offshore Shell would cause Offshore Shell to
recognize, from a U.S. tax perspective, a gain or loss equal to the
difference between the amount received and the shell entity's basis in
the stock, unless the redemption is "essentially equivalent to a
dividend.' ' 118 Otherwise, the amount received by Offshore Shell in
exchange for its stock would be considered a dividend for U.S. tax119
purposes. In evaluating whether a "complete redemption" has
occurred, however, section 302(c) requires that the transaction be
evaluated on the basis of constructive as well as actual stockS• 120
ownership. Under the ownership attribution rules of section 318,
the Offshore Shell is treated as constructively owning the Foreign
Bank shares owned and optioned by the U.S. taxpayer because the
U.S. taxpayer holds the option to acquire an 85% ownership interest
in the Offshore Shell.121 Thus, Offshore Shell cannot be said under
section 302(b) to have completely redeemed its interest in Foreign
Bank.
In other words, unless the Service could demonstrate on some
other basis that the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a
dividend under section 302(b)(1), which is a murky standard at best,
Offshore Shell would be treated for U.S. tax purposes as though it
received dividend income rather than redemption proceeds from
Foreign Bank. Of course, Offshore Shell is domiciled in a tax haven
jurisdiction that imposes no corporate or income tax and is beyond the
range of U.S. tax jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the U.S. taxpayer could
117 See KPMG Tax Opinion Letter Template Dated July 2, 1998, 2 PSI Tax
Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 990, 993; see also Johnson, supra note 114, at 433-
37.
,8 I.R.C. § 302(a), (b)(1), (b)(3).
119 See I.R.C. § 302(a), (b).
120 I.R.C. § 302(c).
121 See id.; I.R.C. § 318.
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argue that since the redemption of shares represents dividend income
for Offshore Shell, the Cayman entity's basis in the redeemed shares
should be shifted to the U.S. taxpayer as a "proper adjustment" under
Treas. Reg. section 1.302-2(c).22  As a consequence, when the U.S.
taxpayer sells its small number of Foreign Bank shares and its own
option, the U.S. taxpayer would realize a sizeable capital loss that
could be used to offset existing gains.
Among other things, therefore, the FLIP and OPIS tax shelter
structures are premised on the definition of "redemption" under
section 302, the definition of "proper adjustment" under Treas. Reg.
section 1.302-2(c), and a particular interpretation of the stock
ownership attribution rules of section 318. The template opinion
letters for these structures cite various revenue rulings and cases as
supporting KPMG's interpretation of these provisions. 124 In Notice
2001-45, the Service announced that, in its view, the above-described
transaction represented a redemption under section 302 rather than a
dividend and that the shift in basis from Offshore Shell to the U.S.
taxpayer was not a proper adjustment as that term is used in Treas.
Reg. section 1.302-2(c). 2' Both are technical concepts as reflected in
the Code and related regulations. Both interpretations seem
supportable. To further demonstrate the interpretive difficulty,
Treasury at one point issued proposed regulations intended to clarify
both section 302 and Treas. Reg. section 1.302-2(c) as precluding the
126FLIP/OPIS transaction structure, but subsequently withdrew the
proposed regulations in the face of numerous critical comments."'
As with BLIPS, the FLIP and OPIS shelters face numerous issues
beyond the proper interpretation of section 302, including an
economic substance challenge. Thus, the courts could find taxpayers
participating in the FLIP and OPIS shelters to be liable - and the
government could successfully prosecute the KPMG defendants -
122 See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (2006).
113 See KPMG Tax Opinion Letter Template Dated July 2, 1998, 2 PSI Tax
Shelter Hearings, supra note 96, at 990, 994-97 (analyzing sections 302 and 318 in
connection with the FLIP/OPIS shelter).
124 See id. (citing and discussing cases and revenue rulings).
125 I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129.
126 See Redemptions Taxable as Dividends, 67 Fed. Reg. 64331 (proposed Oct.
18, 2002).
121 See Withdrawal of Proposed Regulations Relating to Redemptions Taxable as
Dividends, 71 Fed. Reg. 20044 (Apr. 19, 2006) (withdrawing earlier proposed




without ever resolving the application of lenity or deference in
interpreting section 302. It is also possible, however, for the outcome
of these cases to turn on the interpretation of section 302.
D. Implications
The interpretational elements of the BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS
shelters demonstrate the role that statutory ambiguity plays in many,
if not most, tax shelters. The possibility that courts might apply lenity
more often in addressing those ambiguities is hugely problematic for
tax law administration even beyond the tax shelter context. The Code
is littered with ambiguity. Sometimes, Congress expressly leaves
statutory gaps for Treasury to fill.'28 Other times, ambiguities only
become noticeable through taxpayer application. Thus, Congress has
designated Treasury and the Service as primarily responsible for
administering the Code in general. 12 Where the Code is susceptible
of more than one reasonable interpretation, Treasury and the Service
have to choose, and in so doing take into account a range of tax policy
concerns including but not limited to revenue raising and
administrability.
Treasury and the Service play a critical role in preserving the
integrity of the Code and protecting the tax base through both
administrative interpretation and enforcement. The primary virtue of
the Chevron revolution has been the resultant shift of policymaking
inherent in statutory interpretation from the courts to administrative
agencies like Treasury and the Service. 3° In the civil context, the
Chevron and Skidmore deference doctrines allow the courts to avoid
interfering in tax policy decision making but still act as a check against
arbitrary and capricious agency actions.
Treasury and the Service depend heavily on regulations, rulings,
and other less formal guidance to administer the Code and protect tax
system integrity, but they simply cannot anticipate every potential
128 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(i)(5), 167(e)(6), 357(d)(3), 453(j)(1), 952(d), 1502; see
also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECrION, REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE GRANTS OF
REGULATORY AUTHORITY 2-6 (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.nysba.org/
Content/ContentGroups/Section Informationl/TaxSectionReports/ll21rpt.PDF
(claiming and categorizing more than 550 specific authority grants).
129 See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (giving Treasury the authority to promulgate "all
necessary rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the Code).
130 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-
45 (1984) (emphasizing that policy choices are inherent in interpreting ambiguous
statutes); see also discussion, supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (elaborating).
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scenario that might test the Code. Often, statutory ambiguity
becomes apparent merely as taxpayers attempt to apply the Code to
real-world facts. Transactional goals drive most tax planning, albeit
with ample room for minimizing the related tax burden. In the
context particularly of the most recent generation of tax shelters,
however, those real-world facts are often specially contrived. In
battling abusive tax shelters, Treasury and the Service need all the
help that they can get. Given the government's reliance on less formal
guidance like notices as the first line of defense against abusive
transactions, Skidmore deference in particular represents an
important weapon in the government's arsenal.
To the extent that ordinary transactional tax planning and abusive
tax shelters involve the same Code sections, however, the criminal
prosecution of tax shelters may lead the courts to apply lenity rather
than Chevron or Skidmore deference in resolving civil as well as
criminal cases involving those provisions. At that point, not only
would the courts take the place of Treasury as the primary interpreter
of the Code in more cases, but the operative interpretational
standards would shift from the pro-government Chevron and
Skidmore to the pro-taxpayer rule of lenity.
III. POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS
As already noted, while the Supreme Court in Sweet Home came
down on the side of Chevron deference instead of lenity for a
longstanding, legally-binding regulation, the Court's analysis in that
case exposed a tension in the Court's jurisprudence between the
legislative function and fair warning justifications for the rule of lenity.
Moreover, the Court's jurisprudence to date has not addressed the
question of lenity versus deference for guidance formats that are less
formal than binding regulations published in the Code of Federal
Regulations, such as revenue rulings and notices. The Court could
pursue any of several different approaches to resolve these issues in
future cases. Although space considerations preclude a full
exploration of the topic, this Part of the essay will briefly outline the
alternatives and some of the issues raised by each.
A. Supreme Court Signals: Lenity Trumps
The Court's analysis in several cases suggests a few theories under
which the rule of lenity might trump the various deference doctrines
outright. First, the deference models articulated in Chevron,
Skidmore, and National Muffler apply only in the absence of clear
2007]
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statutory meaning. In other words, a court has to decide that the
relevant statutory provision is ambiguous before any doctrine requires
the court to defer to the government's interpretation. Lenity also
applies only where ambiguity exists. In discussing the circumstances
in which all of the Chevron, Skidmore, and National Muffler deference
doctrines will apply, the Court has called for employing traditional
canons of statutory construction in evaluating whether a statute's
• 131
meaning is clear. In other words, as a canon of construction, the
rule of lenity may operate as a tie-breaker between competing
statutory interpretations to establish a statute's supposed plain
meaning. A court applying the rule of lenity thus never gets past that
first-level inquiry and, consequently, does not have the opportunity to
defer to the government.'32 In the recent case of National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Court
explicitly referred to the rule of lenity as a canon of interpretation that
might be applied to conclude that a statute is unambiguous, such that
deference to the agency would be inappropriate.'
Elevating the rule of lenity over judicial deference best
effectuates the policy that the legislatures rather than courts or
agencies should make the moral judgments that underlie the
criminalization of primary behavior. 4 Courts satisfied with deferring
to agency experts as they make the technocratic policy choices
inherent in resolving statutory ambiguities may and probably should
feel less comfortable with deferring to the same unelected bureaucrats
in matters of morality.
Another possible reason for allowing the rule of lenity to trump
even Chevron deference in this manner arises from the theoretical
premises of the different doctrines. The rule of lenity bears at least a
tangential relationship to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments."' By comparison, according to the Court in
131 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2224-25 (2006) (applying
the canons of construction in a Chevron analysis); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,
402-03 (2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (discussing the role of canons of construction in
Chevron step one analysis).
132 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
983-85 (2005); United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1992) (Thomas, J.
concurring).
133 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
983-85 (2005).
134 See discussion supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (comparing the
moral aspects of criminalization with the more technocratic policy choices inherent in
most regulatory interpretations).
135 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (discussing the
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Mead, the Chevron deference doctrine is premised on a presumption
that Congress has delegated primary interpretive responsibility to a
116particular agency rather than the courts. Skidmore and National
Muffler deference, meanwhile, merely reflect judicial policy based on
comparative institutional capacities."'
Lenity's status as an absolute constitutional requirement rather
138than a quasi-constitutional canon of construction is questionable.
Several state legislatures have rejected the rule of lenity in drafting
139their own criminal statutes. Yet state legislative rejections of the
rule of lenity have been explicit, while the purported legislative
command underlying the Chevron doctrine is at best implied, if not
entirely fictional,14 and Skidmore and National Muffler deference
possess no such legislative support. It would be rather circular to
relationship between lenity and Due Process); United States v. Velastegui, 199 F.3d
590, 593 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing lenity as "a manifestation of the fair warning
requirement" of the Due Process Clause).
136 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 & n.11 (2001); see also
Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
(articulating same understanding of Chevron); discussion, supra note 41 and
accompanying text (discussing Chevron's premise).
117 See Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 475-77 (1979);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944); see also discussion, supra notes
42-49 and accompanying text (discussing Skidmore and National Muffler premises).
138 See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference,
17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 525-26 (2003) (discussing the constitutional status of the
rule of lenity in criminal cases). But see Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and
Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. LAW REV. 1043, 1067 (2006)
(describing lenity as a "common law tradition"); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal
Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. Cr. REV. 345, 346-47 (1994) (describing lenity as a
"quasi-constitutional" doctrine best understood as a form of the nondelegation
doctrine).
139 See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 5.00 (McKinney) ("The general rule that a penal
statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this chapter, but the provisions
herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote
justice and effect the objects of the law."); Idaho Code § 73-102 ("The compiled laws
establish the law of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed, with a view to
effect their objects and to promote justice."); see also SINGER, supra note 18, at §59.7
(discussing legislative modification of the rule of lenity).
140 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2132 (2002) (noting "even adherents to [Chevron] theory...
acknowledge that the evidence of such enacting congressional intent is 'weak' and
even 'fictional'); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (acknowledging that "any rule adopted in this field
represents merely a fictional, presumed intent").
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suggest that the mere existence of statutory ambiguity in a hybrid
regulatory statute reflects Congress's intent that lenity should not be
applied to resolve that ambiguity. In light of lenity's pedigree, the
Court could conceivably adopt a rule that requires Congress to be
explicit in overriding the rule of lenity in favor of agency primacy and
judicial deference.
Nevertheless, despite the Court's reference to lenity in its Brand
X opinion, it is difficult to reconcile the Court's holding in that case
with giving lenity precedence over Chevron deference. Brand X
involved an agency interpretation of the Communications Act,
advanced through a Chevron-eligible format, that in effect overturned
an earlier reading of that statute adopted by the Ninth Circuit.14 The
Court held that, notwithstanding the appellate court's earlier
resolution of the statute's meaning, because the statutory language
was itself ambiguous, the agency's subsequent contrary interpretation
was entitled to Chevron deference. 142 The primary rationale behind
the Court's decision to apply Chevron under such circumstances was
"to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with
the implementing agency" so that the agency could "consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.,
143
Utilizing the rule of lenity as a tie-breaker between clarity and
ambiguity at the step one stage would foreclose the opportunity for
the agency subsequently to adopt an alternative interpretation, even
through the notice-and-comment process, and thus would put the
courts rather than the agency in the position of resolving statutory
meaning. Not all regulatory statutes include hybrid enforcement
mechanisms, so perhaps this trade off is the price that Congress pays
for adopting such provisions. Nevertheless, such an approach would
represent a dramatic curtailing of the judicial deference doctrines'
scope.
B. Academic Theory: Lenity as a Third Step
Two scholars have offered alternative proposals for incorporating
the rule of lenity into the standard deference model as a third step to
Chevron's (or Skidmore's) two, although with different variations on
the theme.
Patricia Chapman suggests that after a reviewing court has
141 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. A'ssn, 545 U.S. at 981-83.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 981 (internal citations omitted).
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determined first that a statute is ambiguous and second that the
agency's interpretation is reasonable, the court could then undertake
a third inquiry evaluating both the agency's efforts to publicize its
interpretations of the statute and likelihood that the regulated party
actually received notice of those interpretations.144 Particularly if the
agency's interpretations are informal in nature, as in the Skidmore
context, there may be some question whether potential violators had
adequate notice. Under such circumstances, the rule of lenity would
apply and could potentially invalidate an otherwise reasonable
interpretation of the statute.
Chapman's approach presents a similar, though slightly lesser,
difficulty to the Court's passing suggestion of incorporating lenity into
Chevron step one. As Chapman correctly notes, the typical notice-
and-comment regulation surely would satisfy her proposed third-step
inquiry, but more informal interpretations may not. 14 If the courts
then use the rule of lenity to impose an interpretation, however, the
Brand X concern of freezing the statute's meaning and denying the
agency's subsequent interpretive flexibility arises anew.
In a slightly different context, arguing for the "Chevronization" of
federal criminal law, Dan Kahan has suggested limiting lenity's
applicability to those cases in which "the Department of Justice has
failed to give a reasoned justification for a broad reading in advance
.. ,,146
of prosecution. Kahan offered his proposal for purposes of
interpreting the criminal code, not hybrid regulatory statutes.
Nevertheless, one could translate his model to the regulatory context
by requiring the reviewing court to apply Chevron or Skidmore first to
evaluate the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation, and
contemplate the rule of lenity only in the face of a conclusion that the
agency's interpretation is not a reasonable one. One potential
obstacle to applying such an approach in the context of hybrid
regulatory statutes is its elevation of the judicial deference doctrines
over the rule of lenity. While, as noted above, the rule of lenity is
arguably a quasi-constitutional canon subject to legislative override
rather than a constitutional requirement, the legislative command
underlying the Chevron doctrine is more assumed than real, and
Skidmore lacks even that degree of legislative support.14 ' Accordingly,
the Court may be reluctant to relegate lenity to the status of a third-
144 See Chapman, supra note 20, at 165-67.
145 See id. at 167.
146 Kahan, supra note 20, at 510.




Chapman and Kahan both strongly emphasize the fair warning
justification for the rule of lenity. Their suggestions are less
supportive of the legislative function concern that Congress should be
148the one to decide which actions are criminal. Nevertheless, the
willingness of contemporary courts to draw from legislative history
and other extra-textual sources to discern statutory meaning before
applying the rule of lenity suggests that the legislative function
149
rationale has trumped fair warning in dictating lenity's scope.
C. A Willfulness Exception
At least in the context of interpreting the Code, and perhaps in
some other areas of regulation as well, a court inclined to curtail the
applicability of the rule of lenity might choose to hang its hat on
willfulness as a requirement for criminal culpability. For all criminal
tax cases, section 7201 requires the prosecution to demonstrate that
the defendant "willfully attempt[ed] to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof."'5 ° In Cheek v. United
States, a tax protester case, the Court interpreted the willfulness
element of section 7201 as requiring proof of a "voluntary, intentional
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violation of a known legal duty" to sustain a criminal conviction. In
Thompson/Center Arms, by contrast, the Court expressly observed
that the National Firearms Act does not impose a willfulness
requirement for criminal liability.52 In fact, in invoking the rule of
lenity, the Thompson/Center Arms Court expressly contrasted the
case before it with the circumstances of Cheek.53
Moreover, the Court's reasoning in O'Hagan v. United States
potentially bolsters the notion that the presence of a willfulness
requirement for criminal liability could negate the applicability of the
'48 Because the Chevron deference doctrine assumes an affirmative congressional
decision that an agency, rather than the courts, should assume primary interpretive
authority over a statute, one could argue that giving precedence to Chevron over
lenity better respects that legislative choice. Such respect is not necessarily
synonymous with consigning the responsibility for defining criminal behavior to the
legislative branch, however.
149 But see United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307-09 (1992) (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (questioning whether employing legislative history over the rule of lenity
raises fair warning concerns).
150 I.R.C. § 7201.
151 498 U.S. 192,200-01 (1991).
152 See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517 (1992).
153 See id. at 517-18.
[Vol. 26:905
Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG
rule of lenity.'1 O'Hagan involved a defendant convicted of multiple
counts of mail fraud, money laundering, securities fraud, and other
securities violations. One of the issues considered by the Court was
whether the so-called "misappropriation theory" upon which the
prosecution based its case represented an appropriate interpretation
of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-
1165 promulgated thereunder. Despite obvious ambiguity on the issue,
the Court upheld as "consistent with the statute" the government's
interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as accommodating
misappropriation theory. In response to O'Hagan's brief and a strong
dissent from Justice Thomas, both of which urged applying the rule of
lenity, the Court noted the statute's willfulness requirement as a
"sturdy safeguard." '57
O'Hagan alone seems inadequate to support the conclusion that
the Court has explicitly adopted the willfulness approach to the rule of
lenity. In the subsequent, non-tax case of United States v. Lanier, the
Court applied the vagueness doctrine to interpret the substantive
intent of a statutory prohibition notwithstanding a separate willfulness
element in the same provision.5 8 Nevertheless, a recent note in the
Harvard Law Review elegantly interprets several other recent
Supreme Court cases to support limiting the scope of the rule of lenity
to statutes lacking a willfulness requirement;' 9 and the O'Hagan
approach has its strength and weaknesses.
Relying upon the willfulness aspect of section 7201 to distinguish
tax code interpretation from Thompson/Center Arms and its progeny
would to some degree give effect both to lenity and to deference.
There can be no question of notice or fair warning where the
government must demonstrate actual subjective knowledge of a legal
obligation, even if the reviewing court also defers to Treasury's
interpretation of the Code. Indeed, employing willfulness in this
manner seems analogous to the Sweet Home Court's rationale for
allowing Chevron deference where a long-standing regulation clarified
the ambiguous statute. Recall that the Court's analysis in Sweet Home
comes down to recognizing that legally-binding agency regulations can
make a regulated party's obligations under the law clear even if the
154 521 U.S. 642, 644 (1997).
15 See id. at 648-49.
156 See id. at 649.
117 Id. at 665-66.
158 520 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1997); see also discussion, supra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text (comparing vagueness doctrine with rule of lenity).
159 See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2436-37 (2006).
2007]
Virginia Tax Review
statute is not, and thus alleviate lenity's fair warning concern.' 6° The
willfulness element of section 7201 and similar statutes accomplishes
the same goal, though such an approach deemphasizes the legislative
function policy behind lenity much in the same way as the Court's
analysis in Sweet Home. Moreover, while not an explicit legislative
command to disregard the rule of lenity in tax law interpretation, the
Court could reasonably conclude that section 7201 is close enough to
count. 161
Nevertheless, the willfulness solution for resolving the impasse
between lenity and deference relies heavily on the Court's
interpretation of section 7201 in Cheek. There is some debate over
the extent to which Cheek applies outside the tax context.
162
Moreover, not all regulatory statutes include a willfulness element, so
this approach to reconciling lenity and deference is not universally
applicable. Still, the Court could reasonably utilize the willfulness
requirement of section 7201 to resolve the dilemma of lenity versus
deference in tax cases in favor of deference without a great doctrinal
shift.
IV. THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Circling back to the Justice Department's decision to add criminal
prosecution to its arsenal in the battle against tax shelters, while the
reconciliation of lenity and Skidmore deference ultimately falls to the
courts, the Justice Department's prosecution of the KPMG case and
others like it may represent a tipping point. Although space
limitations again preclude full consideration of the idea, this Part of
the essay will briefly elaborate this suggestion.
John Shepard Wiley, Jr. has explored another, related line of
jurisprudence, including the Cheek case, in which the Court has
increasingly demanded proof of knowledge of the law to support a
• • 163
criminal conviction. From the Court's opinions, Wiley identifies as
160 See discussion, supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
161 See discussion, supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
162 Compare Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 142, 149 (1994) (applying
Cheek outside the tax context), with Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194-95
(1998) (distinguishing Cheek and Ratzlaf as applicable only to highly technical
statutes like the tax code); see also Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of
Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 369-87
(1998) (dissecting the Court's jurisprudence on the issue).
163 See John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999).
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the basis for this trend a decline in the Court's faith in prosecutorial
discretion.' 64 Wiley suggests several reasons for this loss of faith,
including the increased number of federal crimes as well as civil
penalties and sentencing changes that transferred power from judges
to federal prosecutors. 165 Although Wiley does not say so explicitly,
many of the cases that Wiley highlights resemble those discussed
above in which the Court has brought lenity into the civil context in
that they involve areas of the law that have received particular
prosecutorial attention in the last few decades, such as firearms' 66 or
financial transactions.
61
It seems reasonable, therefore, to hypothesize that a combination
of aggressive prosecutions and increased judicial skepticism toward
prosecutorial discretion may influence the Court toward a more
cautious posture particularly when dealing with technical statutory
crimes. If the government's argument, while technically colorable,
nevertheless seems to overreach, then the Court may be more likely
to extend a rule such as lenity or willfulness as a signal of its
.. 168
discomfort with the prosecution. Given the queasiness with which
many lawyers view the KPMG case and other tax shelter prosecutions,
pursuing criminal penalties in tax shelter cases may represent the sort
of scenario that could push the Court to expand its application of the
rule of lenity in the civil context.
Wiley lauds the Court's newfound skepticism toward
prosecutorial discretion and seeks to push it further in the criminal
context.9 In the civil regulatory arena, however, as discussed above,
the application of such rules could substantially undermine agency
flexibility and thrust the courts back into the policy-making role that
the deference doctrines allow them to avoid. Some agencies act
16 See id. at 1058-61.
165 See id. at 1061-65.
166 See discussion, supra notes 73-79 (discussing United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992)); see also Wiley, supra note 163, at
1042-43 (discussing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), also a firearms case).
167 See discussion, supra notes 64-72 (discussing Crandon v. United States, 494
U.S. 152 (1990)); see also Wiley, supra note 163, at 1037-38 (discussing Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), which involved food stamp fraud); Wiley, supra
note 163, at 1039-41 (discussing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), in which
the defendant structured repayment of a gambling debt to avoid cash transaction
reporting requirements).
'6' Compare Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 142 (1994), and Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201-02 (1991), with Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184,
193-94 (1998).
169 See Wiley, supra note 163, at 1057.
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primarily through regulations entitled to Chevron deference, so given
the Court's unwillingness thus far to allow lenity to trump Chevron,
perhaps the issue of lenity versus Skidmore deference makes little
difference. By contrast, the Treasury Department and the Service
rely heavily on informal, nonbinding guidance in their enforcement
efforts. Thus, in the tax context, a shift of the standard of review of
such interpretations from Skidmore deference to the rule of lenity
could have significant implications for enforcement efforts beyond tax
shelters.
If this trend toward lenity is in fact due to a mixture of aggressive
prosecution and declining judicial confidence in prosecutorial
judgment as to which cases to prosecute, perhaps Justice Department
prosecutors themselves can avoid the mess entirely by exercising
greater discretion. In other words, at least in the tax context, maybe
the government can avoid the encroachment of lenity into the civil
enforcement context by limiting criminal prosecution to tax protesters
and their ilk while leaving tax shelters to the Code's civil enforcement
mechanisms. If the Court does not perceive that tax is an area where
prosecutors are inclined to pursue novel and creative criminal cases,
the Court may be less likely to see a problem with judicial deference,
particularly given the willfulness element of section 7201. At a
minimum, the government should deliberate carefully just how
aggressive it wants to be in pursuing criminal prosecutions in the tax
shelter area. It might not like the end result.
V. CONCLUSION
Abusive tax shelters are a problem. It is easy to sympathize with
and even cheer for the government as it employs more creative and
aggressive tactics in combating the scourge. Yet zealous efforts often
yield unintended consequences.
I do not believe that the Supreme Court is actively seeking to
impose the rule of lenity upon the federal income tax system. In
responding to the essay, Steven Dean and Lawrence Solan argue that
such a result is unlikely.170 Perhaps they are right. Nevertheless,
recent case law suggests that such a move is possible; and aggressive
criminal prosecution of tax shelters could just inspire the Court to
move precisely in that direction. The government should consider
carefully whether that is a path they are willing to tread; for once we
are on that path, it may be difficult to turn back.
170 See Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating
Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879, 892 (2007).
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